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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts-Causal Connection Between Automobile Collision and Injury
Suffered During Immediately Subsequent Events.-The plaintiff was
a guest in a car owned and operated by her husband and insured by the
defendant. In the early evening the car was passing a farm, and cows
were crossing the highway from the pasture into the barn. The auto-
mobile struck one of the cows, stunning it and knocking it down upon
the highway. The front end of the automobile was damaged but neither
occupant was injured. Immediately following the accident the plaintiff
left the car with the intention of going to the farmhouse to inform the
family of the accident. The plaintiff returned to the car without having
reached the farmhouse, and it was then that she sustained the injury
of which complaint was made. The injured cow regained consciousness,
rose to its feet, rushed from the scene, and in so doing ran into the
plaintiff causing her considerable injury. Plaintiff sued defendant in-
surance company, alleging that her injuries were the direct result of the
negligent act of her husband in failing properly to drive the automobile
in which they were riding. Held: That plaintiff's husband was negli-
gent in failing to keep a proper lookout, that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision with the cow, and that such negligence
was also the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by.the plaintiff.
Brown v. Travelers' Indemnity Company, 28 N.W. (2d) 306 (Wiscon-
sin, 1947).
This case makes quite clear the trend in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court with regard to the definition of proximate cause where there is
a question of superceding cause. It should be an excellent case, both
for citation and reference, because of its peculiar fact situation. Two
cases were cited by the court in support of the holding: Hatch v. Smaill
and Kramer v. Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R. Co.2 In neither of those
cases was the one seeking damages quite so far removed from the first
event in the sequence leading to the injuries. But in both the injuries
occurred while the plaintiff was attempting to correct a situation
created by the negligence. In Hatch v. Smail' the plaintiff was helping
to right a car in which he and the negligent party had been riding, and
which had overturned due -to the latter's negligence. In Kramer v.
Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R. Co.4 the plaintiff was attempting to apply
the brakes on a railroad car which had been negligently placed in mo-
tion by the defendant. Both cases stressed the following quoted prin-
ciple:
"An intervening act of a human being or animal which
is a normal response to the stimulus of a situation created by
the actor's negligent conduct, is not a superceding cause of
2 Hatch v. Smail, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W. (2d) 460 (1945).
2 Kramer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 226 Wis. 118, 176 N.W. 113 (1937).
3 Fn. 1, supra.
4 Fn. 2, supra.
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harm to another which the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about."5
But in both of those cases it was the plaintiff's actions which were
held to be a reasonable response to the stimulus of the negligently
created situation. In the principle case, however, the plaintiff was not
the author of the act which immediately caused the injury. It was the
action of a cow which the defendant insisted was a superceding cause.6
The court stated :7
"The cow was badly injured in the accident and her act,
upon regaining consciousness, of running into and attacking
the plaintiff was a normal response of an injured animal."
It is here that the decision gathers strength. The action of the
cow is apparently an intervening force and one that is not necessarily
foreseeable. Tort law places liability when, although the act and its
specific results were unforeseeable, there is a direct causal sequence,
Here legal cause was found, though the attack of the cow was unfore-
seeable, because the negligence of the plaintiff's husband directly
created the condition or stimulus to which the cow reacted in a natural
and normal manner.
The above paragraph demonstrates the confusion which the use
of the words "superceding cause" and "intervening force" so often
creates, for to the average observer a cow suddenly jumping to its feet
and rushing from the scene would be clearly a new and separate cause
for harm or injury. But in reality it is not a "superceding cause" in a
legal sense at all. For the defendant's insured, at the time of the acci-
dent, clearly set in motion a force for potential injury, the same as if
he had, by his negligence, ignited the fuse of a delayed action explo-
sive. The fact that time intervened is immaterial.
Though at first glance the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to be
taking a bold and radical stand on the problem of intervening cause,
in point of fact it is doing no such thing. This decision rests squarely
on safe and settled principles of direct causation. Where the plaintiff's
injury falls in the class of foreseeable harms covered by the duty of
care the tortfeasor may be made to respond in damages for all the
results, foreseeable or not, which flow directly from his negligent act.9
5 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 443.6 To apply the rule in the same way as it is used in the Hatch Case and the
Kramer Case would be to say that, had the cow sustained further injury by
running into the plaintiff, the owner of the cow would be entitled to additional
damages.
7 Brown v. Travelers' Indemnity Co., 28 N.W. (2d) 306 (1947) at p. 307.
8 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, West Publishing Co. (Hornbook
Series, 1947).
g These principles are set out fully in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223,
234 N.W. 372 (1931).
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In an article by Thomas G. Godfrey 0 it is pointed out that the
decision in Hatch v. Smail" is in direct accord with the principles stated
in the Restatement of the Law of Torts. It might be added here that
the court in the principal case looked to the same source to support its
decision.
In the Restatement of the Law of Torts it is said that one of the
tests for discovering whether or not the conduct of the negligent party
was in fact a "substantial cause" qf the harm done is, "Whether the
actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in con-
tinuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created
a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the
actor is not responsible."'12 This excerpt is quoted by the court in
Hatch v. Smai"3 but not in the principal case. However, the facts of
the principal case may be said to fit nicely within it. The actor, by in-
juring the cow, created a force which, though its effect was not felt
immediately, clearly continued in "active operation up to the time of
the harm." Thus the facts, measured by the rule of the Restatement of
the Law of Torts, demonstrate that the negligence of the plaintiff's
husband was a substantial cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
RicHA.RD F. HOFFMAN
10 1947 Wisconsin Law Review (March) at p. 261.
XI Fn. 1, supra.
12Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 433 (c).
1Ibid. Also see Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 433 (c).
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